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I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary. .. may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments. '

What does it mean for a judiciary to be "independent"? What are the
conditions required for judicial independence to exist? Many scholars
have addressed these questions, but there remains much disagreement as
to the answers.2 For some, judicial independence requires little more
than life tenure for judges,3 while for others, judicial independence
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1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
2.
For a survey, see Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial Independence: Often Cited,
Rarely Defined, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129 (2006).

3.

Stephen B. Burbank, Barry Friedman, & Deborah Goldberg, Introduction, in

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 3
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).

requires budgetary control 4 or an appointment process that involves
more than legislators doing the choosing.5 Still other scholars tout the
virtues of judicial independence without defining clearly what they mean
by "independence", 6 and others (such as legal realists and most political
scientists) suggest that judges are at least partially
independent because
7
they exercise discretion with every decision.

4. Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in
Mexico, J. LATIN AM. STUD. 705 (2000).
5.
Erika Moreno, Brian F. Crisp, & Matthew Soberg Shugart, The Accountability
Deficit in Latin America, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 79 (Scott
Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds., 2003).

6. Eugenia Froedge Toma, CongressionalInfluence and the Supreme Court: The
Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1991).
7.
Most modem public law scholars in political science, including Dahl,
McCloskey, Murphy, Nagel, Pritchett, Schubert, and Spaeth and his various coauthors,
can be housed within the halls of the Realist School. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY
(1964) [hereinafter MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY]; STUART S. NAGEL,
THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT,

THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); GLENDON SCHUBERT, EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE
COURT (1959); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965); HAROLD J. SPAETH,
SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING (1963); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:

The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 275, 279 (1957) [hereinafter
Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy].
The Realists were ascending during the turbulent 1930s, when the Supreme Court was
trying to hold Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats to Lochner era concepts of the
role of the state, property, and contracts. Thus, the Realists confronted the debate about
popular versus judicial sovereignty head on. Many Realists, including nearly all modem

political scientists, argued for some form of popular sovereignty.
Most modem political scientists who study the court, though not entirely normative, do
take a realist position. That is, they assume that law is policy and that judges are
engaged in policy making. Much of the focus of political scientists' research, then, has
been to find the source of judicial preferences. One branch, called the attitudinalists,
search for judicial preferences in the personal attitudes and characteristics of the judges.
These scholars follow Pritchett, Schubert, Nagel and Spaeth, whose pioneering studies
developed many of the techniques used to study judges' attitudes. See PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT, supra; SCHUBERT, EMPIRICAL ANALYSES, supra; SCHUBERT, THE
JUDICIAL MIND, supra; S.S. Nagel, PoliticalPartyAffiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55

AM. POL. SCI. REv. 843 (1961); NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra; and H. SPAETH,
SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING, supra. More recent works in this paradigm include
Tanenhaus et al., Giles and Walker, Rohde and Spaeth, Baum, Carp and Rowland, Segal,
Carter, Songer and Reid, Perry, Segal and Spaeth, Songer, Segal and Cameron, Kobylka,
and Songer and Lindquist. See ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND
POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983);

H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO

DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1991); DAVID W. ROHDE &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993);

Lawrence Baum, MeasuringPolicy Change in the US. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI.
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REV. 905 (1988); Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of
Appeals Policies: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Stephen Carter, The
Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988); Matthew W. Giles & Thomas G.
Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POLITICS 917
(1975); Joseph F. Kobylka, The Mysterious Case of Establishment Clause Litigation:
How Organized Litigants Foiled Legal Change, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS (Lee
Epstein ed., 1995); Jeffrey A. Segal, PredictingSupreme Court Cases Probabilistically:
The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-81, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891 (1984); Donald R.
Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 673 (1994); Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The
Impact of Justices' Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049
(1996); Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin, & Daniel Rosen, The
Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
(Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). Other scholars have looked for the source of judicial
preferences in public opinion. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1989); Beverly B. Cook, Public Opinion and FederalJudicial Policy,
21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 567 (1977); David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public
Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POLITICS 652
(1985); Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court
Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139 (1987); Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and
Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303 (John B. Gates
& Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); James H. Kuklinski & John E. Stanga, Political
Participationand Government Responsiveness: The Behavior of California Superior
Courts, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1090 (1979). Still others have looked to the pressures of
interest groups. See LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (1985); JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA,
THE POLITICS OF OBSCENITY (1991); KAREN O'CONNOR,WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE
OF THE COURTS (1980); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, OrganizedInterests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988);Marc
Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 95 (1974); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986); Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying:
Women's Rights Groups and the Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 134 (1983); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). A final
set of scholars follows Peltason and Dahl in looking for the institutional sources of
judicial preferences. See JACK W. PELTASON, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS (1955) [hereinafter PELTASON, THE FEDERAL COURTS]; Dahl, Decision-Making
in a Democracy, supra, at 275. These scholars, the New Institutionalists, include
Adamany, Funston, O'Brien, Gates, Marks, Epstein, Walker and Dixon, Gely and
Spiller, Rosenberg, Eskridge and Ferejohn, George and Epstein, Schwartz, Spiller,
Spiller and Spitzer, Zuk et al., Cameron, Schwartz et al., Epstein and Walker, Epstein
and Knight, and Knight and Epstein. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JOHN B. GATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN
REALIGNMENT (1992); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN

In this Article, we shed new light on the debate about judicial
independence by defining judicial independence as an outcome that
emerges from strategic interactions among the judiciary, the legislature, and
the executive. Indeed, for us, judicial independence is not the automatic
result of constitutional or statutory provisions that establish life tenure
for judges, nor is judicial independence limited by checks and balances
or legal traditions. Rather, judicial independence waxes and wanes with
changes in the political composition of our three branches of
government. For instance, during periods of divided government, we

AMERICAN POLITICS (1986); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning

Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 790; David Adamany, The
Supreme Court's Role in Critical Elections, in REALIGNMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
TOWARD A THOERY 229 (Bruce A. Campbell & Richard J. Trilling eds., 1980); Lee
Epstein, & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society:
Playing the Reconstruction Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS, supra; Lee Epstein,
Thomas G. Walker & William J. Dixon, The Supreme Court and Criminal Justice
Disputes. A Neo-Institutional Perspective, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (1989); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original
Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGS. 165 (1992); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and CriticalElections, 69 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 796 (1975); John B. Gates, PartisanRealignment, UnconstitutionalState
Policies, and the U.S. Supreme Court: 1837-1964, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259 (1987); Rafael
Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory
Decisions, with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 263 (1990) [hereinafter Gely & Spiller, Rational Choice Theory at Supreme Court
Decisions]; Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court
ConstitutionalDecisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan, 12 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 45 (1992) [hereinafter Gely Spiller, The PoliticalEconomy of Supreme Court
Constitutional Decisions]; Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme
Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 323 (1992); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein,
The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J.POL. SCI. 1018 (1996); Edward P. Schwartz, Policy,
Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of Supreme Court Decision Making, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 219 (1992); Edward P. Schwartz, Pablo T. Spiller, & Santiago
Urbiztondo, A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51
(1994); Pablo T. Spiller, Rationality, Decision Rules, and Collegial Courts, 12 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 186-90 (1992); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, CongressionalControl
or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations
Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992) [hereinafter Spiller & Gely,
Congressional Control]; Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Choice of
Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 8 (1992); Gary Zuk, Gerard S. Gryski, &
Deborah J. Barrow, Partisan Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, 1869-1992, 21
AM. POL. Q. 439 (1993); C. CAMERON, NEW AVENUES FOR MODELING JUDICIAL POLITICS
(Typescript 1994) (on file with author); B. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on
Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Department of Economics, Washington Univ. 1988) (on file with author).
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expect one chamber of the legislature or the executive branch to protect
judicial independence by vetoing (or threatening to veto) legislative
actions that would overturn Supreme Court decisions. On the flip side,
we expect unified control of government to weaken judicial independence,
as the legislature and executive can coordinate on governmental changes
that may undermine the judiciary's independence. These are just two of
the many predictions that we generate about the "waxing" and "waning"
of judicial independence, and in order to explore these predictions and
several others, we draw upon positive political theory to model formally
the game that is played among our three branches of government.
The foundation of our model stems from Alexander Hamilton's
observation in The FederalistNo. 78 that courts, by themselves, cannot
implement their own orders or opinions. Indeed, for judicial orders and
opinions to have force, courts (most notably, the Supreme Court) must
get the executive and perhaps even the legislative branch behind them.
Although it is difficult for Congress and the president to overturn a court
decision with which they disagree,8 it is much more difficult to get them
to implement a policy that they oppose. However, for judicial orders
and opinions to have an effect the Supreme Court must obtain
compliance from those to whom the orders and opinions are directed:
lower courts, executive agencies, commissions, state and local governments
and their agencies, corporations, and individuals. These actors are the
agents of judicial impact, who, of course, have their own ideas about
what they should and should not be doing, and who will spend their
resources optimally between compliance and dodging oversight.
Thus, in the principal-agent relationship that characterizes the
judiciary and its many agents, the judiciary has neither the capacity to
enforce its will nor the ability to oversee compliance with its instructions.
In this way, the limits on judicial independence are the direct result of
the relative impoverishment of judicial power and of the legislature and
executive's ability to take advantage of the judiciary's relative weakness.
For example, the judiciary does not have a General Accounting Office
(GAO) and its nearly 50,000 oversight agents, as the legislature does.
Nor does it have a far-flung fire-alarm network from which it can cull
reliable signals about compliance and non-compliance and from which it

8.

On congressional overturns of court decisions, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,

Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331

(1991); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional
Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 503 (1996).

can distinguish shirking from bad luck.9 As an illustration of the many
enforcement difficulties that the judiciary faces, note how overseeing
compliance with school desegregation decrees, especially in the face of
hostile school boards, is a lifetime ambition for the Court, one which
necessarily precludes addressing other matters and one for which
compliance notoriously fades into the shadows once the spotlight no
longer shines on the issue.
The purpose of this article is to explore the ideas central to Hamilton's
argument in The FederalistNo. 78. To do this we model the Supreme
Court's choice of doctrine within a policymaking game, where doctrine
defines the rules by which policy is to be chosen, but does not itself
define the policy choices.' 0 The core of the model involves a game
wherein the Court sets doctrine and monitors compliance with its
doctrine. We then examine the tradeoffs that arise as a result of scarcity
and uncertainty in attaining compliance from the Court's agents.
Our key conclusions are threefold. First, the Court, due to imperfect
information and limited resources for hearing appeals, cannot induce
perfect adherence to its doctrine by its agents. Indeed, we show how
doctrine results from the Court's attempts to maximize compliance from
its various agents. Doctrine on this account is not what the Court
believes is the best policy to pursue for its own sake, but rather is an
instrument used to gain compliance. In areas where potential case
numbers are huge relative to the Court's ability to review cases, the
Court must set a lax standard-as in Brown's ambiguous message to
school districts to desegregate with "all deliberate speed." In areas where
the cases are relatively few and the Court highly values the outcome,
such as abortion, the Court can set a tight standard.

9. A fire-alarm network differs from a police-patrol network in that fire alarms
are a decentralized way to acquire information about one's agents and their behavior
whereas police patrols involve active oversight and monitoring of agents. A fire-alarm
network allows principals to respond only to violations of procedure or policy that
generate complaints, rather than having to observe all actors comply with the appropriate
process. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrolsversus FireAlarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCt. 165 (1984).
10. For example the Supreme Court created the Chevron Doctrine which directs
courts to take a two-stage process during review of agency decisions. First, determine if
there is Congressional intent and if so it governs the decision at hand, regardless of the
agency's decision. If the court finds that legislative intent cannot be determined, then it is
to defer to the agency's decision as long as it is reasonable. See McNollgast, Politics and
the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1631 (1995); Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles C. Cameron, Beyond the Median Voter:
Bargaining and Law in the Supreme Court (working paper, Columbia University 2005)
(on file with authors).
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Second, stare decisis emerges in this model from strategic interaction
by the Supreme Court in its supervisory role of the lower courts, not
from any norm or preference on the part of judges to follow precedent.
In our model, a lower court that must decide whether to comply with the
Court's doctrine will either choose its ideal point or the closest point in
the set of acceptable decisions. Non-complying lower courts risk review
by the Court and, if found to be non-complying, having their decision
overturned and moved to the Court's ideal point. This threat induces
many lower courts to comply. Of course, per our first point, the Court
must adjust its doctrine to fit the circumstances of compliance: the
greater the potential number of non-complying courts and the lower the
value of the issue area to the Court, the laxer the doctrine and the wider
the range of acceptable decisions. Our approach implies that stare
decisis emerges as an equilibrium outcome in a game between the Court
and its agents.
Third, political actors can take advantage of this situation by
exacerbating the Supreme Court's scarcity; that is, they can influence
judicial doctrine by expanding the number and reach of executive
agencies, commissions, lower courts and so on. By forcing the Court to
face more cases or by restricting its ability to review cases, legislators
and the executive indirectly affect doctrine by forcing the Court to widen
or narrow the range of acceptable decisions. In this way, elected
officials use structure and process to influence judicial policy in much
the same way that they use administrative structure and process to
influence agency policymaking."
For example, our previous work demonstrated how a unified set of
political branches opposing a Supreme Court could force it to alter its
doctrine in their favor by expanding the lower judiciary and forcing the
Court to face many more potentially non-complying lower courts."
Lower court expansion exacerbates the Court's compliance problem,
forcing them to expand the range of acceptable decisions in the direction
11.
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures, as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987)
[hereinafter McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process];
McNollgast, The PoliticalOrigins of the AdministrativeProcedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 180 (1999) [hereinafter MeNollgast, The PoliticalOrigins].
12. McNollgast, supra note 10.

favored by legislators and the executive. Indirectly they affect the
agenda for the judiciary's choice of doctrine, causing the Court to shift
its focus in policymaking, leaving some areas unattended, while forcing
the Court to use its scarce resources to affect doctrine in other areas.
Our main result is that the more closely aligned and coordinated are the
political branches, the more likely they are to agree on policy outcomes,
which enables them to reduce the number of issues on which the Court
can exercise meaningful independent discretion.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we discuss various
theories of judicial decisionmaking and present our model. In Part III we
discuss the implications of our model. In Part IV, we derive the key
comparative statics of our model. In Parts V & VI, we conclude with a
discussion of how our model sheds light on the waxing and waning of
judicial independence in the United States, and we also discuss the
application of our model to the comparative context.
II. COURTS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE
It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary
encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions
reiterated, is in reality a phantom.... This may be inferred with certainty, from
the general nature of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, from
the manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, and from its
total incapacity to support its usurpations by force ....
There never can be danger
that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the
legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted (sic) with it,
while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption, by
13
degrading them from their stations.

Our approach to judicial independence draws inspiration from the
work of Spiller and his colleagues, 14 who examine the political setting

13.

THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original).

14.
Mario Bergara, Barak Richman, & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court
Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247
(2003); Gely & Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Congressional
Decisions, supra note 7; Gely & Spiller, Constitutional Control, supra note 7; Matias
laryczower, Pablo T. Spiller, & Mariano Tommasi, Judicial Independence in Unstable
Environments, Argentina 1935-1998, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 699 (2002); Pablo T. Spiller,
Regulatory Agencies and the Courts, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

(P. Newman ed., 1997); Spiller & Spitzer, supra note 7; Barry R. Weingast, Rational Choice
Institutionalism, in POLITICAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINE AS DISCIPLINE: RECONSIDERING
POWER, CHOICE, AND THE STATE (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002).Rebecca

Bill Chavez, The Construction of the Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial
Autonomy in Latin America (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University
Department of Political Science May 2001) (on file with author); Rebecca Bill Chavez,
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within which courts are situated, and from Cohen and Spitzer, 5 who
highlight the relationship between the courts and the executive and
explain how this relationship drives the choice of doctrine. We also
build on Shapiro, 6 Pritchett, 7 and Peltason 8 to advance the idea that
courts have limited abilities to implement and oversee their orders and
opinions. Finally, we draw on our earlier work, 9 which first developed
the model of judicial hierarchy on which this Article relies. It is with
humility to these other scholars and to Alexander Hamilton that we
proceed to model the Supreme Court and its agents.
We have three actors in the game that we model. First, the Court must
pick an order or opinion on each of many policy dimensions in
anticipation of how the targets of its policy choices will react. Orders
and opinions are not precise in the sense of specifying a point on a line;
rather, they define a range of acceptable actions by the targets (i.e.,
agents) of their orders and opinions. We call this range of acceptable
policies legal doctrine. Second, the agents to whom the Court addresses
its orders and opinions then act. These agents, whether they are
executive agencies, lower courts or state and local governments have
their own policy preferences and react to and anticipate the Court's
decisions. Third, the Court then reviews a subset of the agents' actions.
We model the choice of legal doctrine in an n dimensional policy
space. We assume that each dimension, k, is separable, so we examine
each issue separately. Thus the choice of legal doctrine is a policy
choice game, where the Court makes a decision one dimension at a time.
The Court's ideal point on any dimension is Sk; and Wk is the weight
(importance) the Court places on any dimension.
Each agent's decision is modeled as a choice of a point on a closed
interval [0, 1]. We denote the decision of an agent, i, on a particular

John Ferejohn, & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of the Politically Independent Judiciary
(working paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University 2004) (on file with author).
15.
Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, JudicialDeference to Agency Action: A
Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431-34 (1996).
16.

MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964); Martin

Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM (Anthony King ed., 1978).
17. See generally C. H. PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT: 195760(1961).
18. See generallyJ. PELTASON, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7.
19. McNollgast, supra note 10, at 1631-83.

dimension as Dik; Nk is the total number of decisions by agents on each
dimension. 20 Agent i's ideal point on any dimension is Lik. The final
decision is Fik.
There are three stages to this game. In the first stage, the Court
chooses doctrine on each of the dimensions by setting an interval of
acceptable decisions around its ideal policy, Sk. It does so by choosing
rk, which defines the interval of acceptable decisions, [Sk - rk, Sk + rk],
around the Court's ideal point, Sk (see Figure 1).2 This interval is the
Court's doctrine on issue k. If the Court's agent chooses from this
interval, it can be assured not to have its decisions overturned on review.
FIGURE

1:

THE COURT'S RANGE OF ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS

-

[

------I
I

Sk - rk,

Sk

-------- ]----Sk + rk

In the second stage of the game, the agents make their decisions. In
this stage, the agents choose Dik strategically to ensure that the final
outcome will be as close to their ideal points as possible. In the third
stage, the Court chooses Rk, the number of cases on dimension k to
review. The Court must pay a cost, Ck, to review any decision, and their
total budget is B. The cases are drawn at random from Nk-the Court
has no information in advance as to which cases are in compliance with
its doctrine, save for a minimal filtering effect in its production function,
which we discuss later.
The agents and the Court share a common set of beliefs, Ok, about the
distribution of agent ideal points on any dimension. The Court's ideal
point and the range of acceptable doctrine are also common knowledge.
However, no player knows what any agent's decision is (except its
own)."
Because the agents only know the distribution of the other
20.
It could also denote the total number of courts, assuming each court makes
only one decision. This. is a safe assumption if we model subsequent decisions by a

particular court as different courts.
21.
As will be seen below, the model does not require that the interval be
symmetric about the' court's ideal point, but we use this formulation to make the model

simpler.
22. , An agent does know what its decision is, but no agents know what any other
agents' decisions are. Furthermore, the court does not know any agents' decisions until

it pays Ck.
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agents' ideal points and the range of acceptable doctrine, and because the
Court chooses which cases to review at random, the agents are "price
takers." This means that no single agent can affect the probability with
which its case will be reviewed.
This game defines a three step linear programming problem. To solve
it, we use the technique of backward induction.

Thus, we start with

stage three first. Let NCk be the number of non-complying decisions on
any dimension. Then Pk = NCk/Nk is the probability that an agent is noncomplying on dimension k. Although the Court does not know which
agents are in compliance, it can calculate NCk in equilibrium from the

distribution of ideal points.
This also implies that Eik = 1ieNCk (Pk I Sk - Dik I/Nk) is the expected
policy change of reviewing a given case on dimension k and moving the
agent's decision (if non-complying) from Dik to Sk or letting it stand (if
complying). The Court's expected payoff is WkEk, which it expects for
each case it reviews on this dimension and which increases from
reviewing a case on dimension k.
In the third stage, the Court therefore chooses the number of cases to
review across all dimensions, {R1, R 2, . . . , Rk}, to maximize:

Z

(WkRkEk)

(1)

k

The Court cannot review more cases than its budget allows, so there is a
budgetary constraint:

I

Rk Ck

B(2)

k

We can now obtain the following Lagrangian:

The first order constrained maximization conditions for this function
obtain when aL/aRk = 0, as below:

(WkEk) +Ck=0,

k= ... K(4)

This implies that, since the Court does not know if a given case on any
dimension complies with its decision or not, the marginal value of
reviewing an additional case on dimension k is equal for all cases.
These equations imply that the Court will rank order the dimensions
from highest to lowest according to its utility weights, Wk, so that k G K
{ 1, 2,... k}. Once the dimensions are rank ordered, the Court then
selects the most important dimension (the one with the highest rank
ordering) and reviews all the cases on this dimension first; Rk = Nk for
this dimension. It then chooses its next highest ranked alternative and
reviews all cases on that dimension. The Court then reviews all possible
dimensions in this way until it expends its budget B. The dimension it is
reviewing when its budget is spent receives only partial enforcement.
This sequence results in a unique optimization strategy for all k,
except where the marginal net payoff among dimensions is equal. In
that case, we make a tie breaking assumption: In the event of a tie, the
Court chooses to enforce the dimension where the ordinate ranking is
highest (k > j).
In the second stage, the agent makes its decisions knowing how the
Court will behave in the third stage.
Agents do not want to be
overturned, because they are better off when the final outcome is closer
to their ideal point. So the agent makes a decision Dik to minimize the
following:

k

k

I

i

(5)

where Fik is the final outcome after stage three and Wik is the weight an
agent i places on dimension k. Notice that Fik is either Dik or Sk, since
non-complying decisions will either be overturned (Fik = Sk) or not
reviewed (Fik = Dik) and complying decisions will not be changed (Fik
Dik).

Conditionsfor JudicialIndependence

[Vol. 15: 105, 2006]

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

Because there are only two outcomes, there are only two strategies an
agent can choose. The agents either "stick" with their own ideal point or
"switch" their ideal point to the upper or lower bound of acceptable
doctrine. An agent whose ideal point is outside of the range of
acceptable decisions will pick its ideal point if it chooses not to comply.
We illustrate two different agents' decisions in Figure 2. First, consider
agent 2, who has an ideal point at L2k. This agent faces no delimma
because its ideal point falls within the range of acceptable doctrine, it
can choose this without risk; indeed, if reviewed, the Court will let this
decision stand. Now consider agent 1, who has an ideal point at Llk. If
agent 1 chooses not to comply and hence to decide its ideal policy, LIk, it
risks being overturned upon review. If dimension K is reviewed, then,
with probability Pk, the Court will review agent l's decision and will
overturn it in favor of its own ideal policy, Sk; with probability (1-Pk),
agent 1 will not be reviewed and its decision will stand. Alternatively,
agent 1 can decide to conform and choose Sk - rk. Clearly, agent 1 ranks
these alternatives Llk, (Sk - rk), Sk.
FIGURE 2: THE AGENTS' DECISION ABOUT WHETHER TO COMPLY

- 1
Llk

[
Sk - rk

I

I

]

Sk

L2k

Sk + rk

Agent i's behavior is determined as follows. If Lik E [Sk - rk, Sk + rk],
then the agent will stick. If the agent's ideal point is not contained in
[Sk - rk, Sk + rk], then there are two cases: the ideal point below the
interval, i.e., Lik E [0, Sk - rk); or above, i.e., Lik E (Sk + rk, 1]. If below,
the agent will stick if and only if:
'Tk I Lik- Sk I -< I Lik- (Sk- rk) I (6a)

where Wk is the odds ratio of being reviewed/not reviewed (which is a
function of Wk, Ck, B, and Pk). Similarly, if its ideal point is above the
interval, the agent will stick if and only if:

T k ILik - SkI

I Lik - (Sk+ rk) I (6b)

The choice to stick or switch always yields a unique optimizing
strategy for the agents at stage two. An important lemma follows
directly from equations (6a) and (6b): There is a "tipping point" at each
end of the interval (TLik and TUik). These points determine the range
where all agents will have a dominant strategy to stick (i.e., Lik e [0,
TLik)) to their own ideal point and the range where all agents have a
dominant strategy to switch (i.e., Lik E [TLik, Sk - rk)) to the upper or
lower bound of acceptable doctrine.
Finally, in the first stage of the game, the Court chooses the range of
acceptable doctrines {r1 , r 2, . . . rk} for each dimension it can afford to
enforce. The Court chooses doctrine to minimize:

ZK

ZNk

Wk

I Fik-Sk 1 (7)

where Fik is the outcome following each agent's decision, as determined
by the next two stages of play. Further, this minimization is subject to
Ck/rk< b, where b is the court's whole budget for writing doctrine at stage
one and where Ck is the Court's cost of intolerance on dimension k. The
optimal strategy for the Court, then, is to pick doctrine on each
dimension that induces agents' responses at stage two and a reviewing
strategy at stage three that yield the highest utility. This is a large linear
programming problem that can be solved since the Court knows the
distribution of the agents' ideal points, Ok. From this distribution, the
Court can calculate the tipping points for any choice of doctrine. From
these points, the Court can calculate NCk, which allows it to calculate the
dimensional rankings in the third stage. Since there exists a unique
response by the agents to the Court's choice of doctrine at stage one and
since theie also exists a unique response by the Court at stage three, we
know each choice of doctrine yields a unique payoff.
It is clear that there is a constrained minimum to equation 7 that is
simply the sum of the estimated probabilities and expected values, all of
which are defined for each stage. The only problem might arise if there
is a tie, and our tie breaking assumption is the same as the one that we
used for stage three: That is, in the event of a tie, the Court picks the one
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where the sum of dimensional rankings is the greatest. It is now clear
that there is a unique optimal strategy for all players at all stages of the
game. This leads us to proposition 1:23
Proposition 1: There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for
each round of play.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

The model implies that the Court never reviews cases on some issues
(those of lesser importance to it), while it focuses carefully on the issues
it cares about.
The model also implies that an agent's compliance with legal doctrine
results not from a preference for stability or an adherence to a norm, but
rather from the Court's threat to enforce its doctrine. Further, when the
Court punishes agents, the punishment meted out is not a loss of prestige
or reputation, but rather a loss in utility to the agents from the
substitution of the Court's ideal point for the agent's decision.
Finally, the greater the resources the Court allocates to a dimension,
relative to the number of cases it must review, the greater the number of
agents on that dimension who will choose to comply with legal doctrine.
IV.

COMPARATIVE STATICS

Although a number of predictions stem from our model, we devote our
attention to four specific comparative statics and invite the interested
reader to derive the others. Specifically, we are interested in how a
change in the number of agents (which increases Nk), the number of the
cases on a dimension (Nk), the cost of reviewing a case on a dimension
(Ck), and the weight the Court puts on a dimension (Wk) affect the
Court's choice of doctrine (rk).
Our previous work 24 studied in detail the comparative statics that
follow from an increase in the number of agents. The idea there was that
increases in the number of agents have different effects, depending on
the location of the new agents' ideal points. In particular, we considered
the case of the judicial hierarchy where the agents are lower courts. We
showed that expanding the lower courts by creating many new courts
whose ideal points lie outside the existing range of acceptable doctrine
23.
24.

McNollgast, supra note 10.
Id.

would in turn force the Supreme Court to expand its range of acceptable
doctrine. The reason for this is that adding lower courts with ideal
points outside the existing range of acceptable doctrine decreases the
probability of any of the lower courts' decisions getting reviewed.
Strategically, lowering this probability induces more lower courts to
choose their ideal policies instead of complying. The reaction of the
Supreme Court, in turn, is then to increase the range of acceptable
doctrine to counteract lower court behavior: expanding the range of
acceptable doctrine means that more lower courts will automatically
comply (their ideal points are within the expanded set) or will be
induced to comply because their ideal points have become closer to the
position demanded by the Supreme Court, making conforming less
costly. These decisions combine to increase the probability that the
remaining non-complying courts will be reviewed, thus reinforcing the
compliance effect.
This comparative static implies that expanding the federal judiciary is
a political tool used by legislators and the executive to force the
Supreme Court to alter doctrine in a way preferred by political actors.
Of course, not all political officials want to do this. Indeed, we showed
that this effect was most likely to occur when a new party attained
unified government after being in the opposition for some time so that
the other party came to dominate appointments to the judiciary." This
includes the Jeffersonian takeover in 1801 after the Federalists had
dominated American politics; the Republicans' takeover in 1861 after
the dominance of the Jacksonian Democrats; and the Democrats'
takeover in 1933 after the Republicans' dominance. The evidence supports
this and related propositions.26
For our next comparative statics result, consider an increase in Nk,
perhaps due to a secular increase in the number of cases or a particular
27
type of problem that arises. Because an increase in Nk increases NCk,
we examine ork/aNCk. There are three possible strategies that the Court
has, depending on the characteristics of the relevant dimension:

25.

Id.

26.

Id; John M. de Figueiredo, Gerald S. Gryski, Emerson H. Tiller & Gary Zuk,

Congress and the PoliticalExpansion of the U.S. District Courts, 2 AM. L. ECON. REV.
107 (2000); McNollgast, A Theory of Judicial Decision Making: The Politics of Creating
Federal Judgeships (working paper, Stanford University 2001) (on file with author); John
M. de Figueiredo, Gerald S. Gryski, Emerson H. Tiller & Gary Zuk, Congress and the
PoliticalExpansion of the U.S. District Courts, 2 AM. L. ECON. REV. 107 (2000).
27.
Ceteris Paribus, since Ok and Ek remain the same, when Nk increases, so does
NCk.
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1. If the dimension is ranked highly (i.e., if it is a dimension of
complete enforcement), then an increase in the number of
non-complying decisions on that dimension leads to a
decrease in enforcement on some other dimension j (j # k).
To see this, recall that the rankings of the dimensions reflect
the marginal value of reviewing a case. A case on a highly
ranked dimension k has, by definition, a higher value than j.
Hence, an increase in the number of decisions on dimension k
forces the Court to review fewer cases on a lower dimension j.
We thus get the expected and sensible result that, since the Court has
limited resources, reviewing more cases on a particulardimension leads
to less enforcement on another.
2. If k is a dimension that the Court ranks low (i.e., if it is a
dimension without enforcement), then there are two possible
outcomes:
i. There is no change in the enforcement strategy of the
Court. A change in the number of non-complying
decisions does not make the Court enforce its doctrine on
this dimension at all.
ii. If the marginal value of reviewing a case on dimension k
increases, then dimension k moves up in rank to a position
where it gets reviewed. This leads to a decrease in
enforcement on a separate dimension, j (j # k).
3. If the dimension k is a dimension that the Court reviews when
it spends its entire budget (i.e., if it is the dimension with
partial enforcement), then an increase in the number of noncomplying decisions leads to either no change in enforcement
or more enforcement (ARk >-0) on dimension k, and either no
change in enforcement or less enforcement on another
dimension j ( # k).
The third comparative static we examine is the change in reviewing
strategy that results from an increase in the cost of reviewing a decision
on any dimension. The results are similar to those above and follow a
similar logic:
1. On a highly ranked dimension, as Ck increases, there is no
change in enforcement on that dimension; however, there is a
decrease in enforcement on another, lower ranked dimension j

( # k). The reason for this is that reviewing cases on a highly

ranked dimension is now more expensive and leaves a smaller
remaining budget with which to review cases of lower value.
2. On a dimension that the Court ranks low, an increase in Ck will
have no effect.
3. On a dimension with partial enforcement, an increase in Ck
will reduce the number of cases the Court will be able to
review. In this case, there are two possible outcomes:
i. The Court will continue to partially enforce this dimension,
but it will review fewer cases.
ii. The Court will substitute the next higher ranked dimension,
j, and drop enforcement on k altogether. This follows
since an increase in Ck leads to a decrease in the value of
reviewing a marginal case on dimension k. Thus, a
decrease in enforcement on k will lead to an increase in
the rank of the next higher ranked dimension, j (j k).
Finally, we examine the effect of a change in the importance of any
dimension to the Court on its choice of doctrine (AWk). A change in
weights may occur for several reasons. For example, political changes,
secular economic or demographic changes, or changes in the Court's
personnel may affect the relative policy salience of various dimensions.
Again, there are three possibilities that follow the logic presented
above:
1. On a highly ranked dimension, an increase in Wk leads to no
change in enforcement or doctrine and to no change on any
other dimension.
2. On a dimension that is not enforced, an increase in Wk has
two possible effects:
i. The increase in importance will not be sufficient to raise
the ranking of k into the dimensions with full or partial
enforcement. In this case, there is no change in the
Court's strategy at any stage.
ii. The increase in importance will make k important enough
to merit full or partial enforcement. This implies that the
Court will either abandon or reduce enforcement on some
other dimension j j # k).
3. On a dimension with partial enforcement, there are two
possible outcomes as well:
i. The Court will continue to partially enforce that dimension.
ii. The dimension k will become fully enforced, and the
Court will either reduce or abandon enforcement on some
other dimension j (j # k).
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V.

IMPLICATIONS

The various comparative statics results show that judicial
independence is never absent, nor is it ever complete.
Several
parameters affect the Court's ability to control the agents. First, the
distribution of agent ideal points affects the size of acceptable doctrine
and hence judicial doctrine-the greater the number of agents far from
the Court's ideal doctrine, the looser the Court's doctrine must be.
Second, the greater the resources allocated to the Court (both in terms of
direct inputs to its own cases and also through cases recognized and
highlighted through signals from the appellate courts), the greater the
ability of the Court to control its agents. Taken together with what we
know from other models, on issues of high political salience that attract
the attention of the political branches, the Court may also be limited in
its discretion and so may not act independently. The reason for such
limited discretion, of course, is that the political branches (particularly
when they are unified) can affect the cost of reviewing a particular case,
the number of agents far from the Court's ideal point, as well as the
weight associated with a particular dimension.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Judicial independence waxes and wanes. Although political scientists
have well characterized these changes, what they have done less well is
explain them. There is a tendency to assume that judicial independence is a
characteristic inherent in the judiciary itself, such as the norms of judges
or the life tenure of judges. 28 Murphy showed that the courts are political
and they respond to political pressure. Others have shown how the Solicitor
General affects the Supreme Court's agenda.29 In our previous work we
have shown that doctrine can be affected by stacking the deck in the
appointment of judges to lower courts.3" In the preceding, we have
shown instead that the power of the judiciary depends critically on the
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government.

28.

MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY, supra note 7.

29.

Karen O'Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the US. Solicitor General in

Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256 (1983); Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae
Briefs by the Solicitor GeneralDuring the Warren and Burger Courts: A Research Note,
41 W. POL. Q. 135 (1988); see generally H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA
SETTING IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1991).

30.

MeNollgast, supra note 10.

The model in this Article yields a range of implications for judicial
behavior. First, stare decisis emerges as an equilibrium outcome in the
strategic interaction of the Supreme Court with the lower courts. Our
comparative statics results imply that the greater the potential for noncompliance by the lower courts, the more lax is judicial doctrine. The
same result holds for the importance of the issue: issues of less salience
to the Supreme Court are likely to have more lax doctrine. In this
approach, doctrine is a tool used by the Supreme Court to induce
compliance.
The model also shows how legislators and the executive have various
strategies to affect the Supreme Court's doctrine. As mentioned,
increasing the number of lower courts affects the ability of the Supreme
Court to enforce its doctrine and, therefore, forces it to expand its
doctrine.3" Political actors have a range of structure and process to affect
the Court's decisions, including setting up specialty courts. The latter
not only remove jurisdiction from the Court, but also allow a much
higher percentage of cases to be heard. In general, elected officials use
structure and process as a means of influencing judicial policy in much
the same way that they use administrative
structure and process to
32
influence agency policymaking.
Finally, our model has implications for the broad overview of judicial
doctrine and the waxing and waning of judicial independence over
American history. One implication of our model is that the judiciary will be
more independent during periods of divided partisan control of
government than during periods of unified partisan control. Indeed,
during periods of divided control, one legislative chamber or the
executive branch serves to protect judicial independence by vetoing (or
threatening to veto) legislative actions that overturn court decisions.
Unlike the gridlock and inaction that characterize periods of divided
government, however, periods of unified government are characterized
by an expansion of government activity that ultimately limits judicial
independence. As we and others demonstrate in previous work, during
periods of unified control the government seeks to expand and stack the
judiciary to serve its own ends.33 It is also well known that the size and
scope of government action greatly expands during periods of unified
government, as each party, once ensconced in power, seeks to enact and
implement its platform and to redirect the existing governmental
31.

Id.

32.

McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 11;

McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, supra note 11; McNoligast, supra
note 11.
33.
McNollgast, supra note 10.

[Vol. 15: 105, 2006]

Conditionsfor JudicialIndependence
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

structure to its purposes. This expansion of activity during periods of
unified government will necessarily cause the Court to focus on fewer
issue areas to enforce its doctrinal choices and will, therefore, limit
judicial independence.
To take a real world example of how judicial independence waxes and
wanes with periods of divided and unified government, consider the
history of judicial independence in the United States. Prior to World
War II, the typical pattern was for one party to dominate electoral
institutions and the courts: the Federalists prior to 1800, the Jeffersonian
and Jacksonian Democrats until 1860; the Republicans until 1930; and
the Democrats until the end of WWII. Indeed, in the seventy years
between 1860 and 1930, the Republicans held unified government in
half the Congresses, while the Democrats held unified government in
only four. Except for some crucial appointments during the Wilson
presidency, the Republicans dominated appointments to the courts during
this era.
This pattern has not held in the post-World War II era, with divided
government and swings between the parties becoming the norm.
Although each party has held unified government for short periods of
time,34 the bulk of this time period has been characterized by periods of
divided government, particularly with a Republican president and a
Democratic Congress or a divided Congress (1955-60, 1969-76, 1981-92).
Given such periods of divided government, no party has been able to
dominate appointments to the courts since World War II.
The patterns of judicial independence that characterized these periods
of unified and divided government fit well with the predictions of our
model. For example, during the periods of unified government prior to
World War 1I, courts were instruments of the ruling party and exhibited
relatively little independence on statutory issues. In contrast, the courts
have been most independent during periods of divided government after
World War II, becoming major interpreters of legislation and champions
for a host of new rights. Although every major Supreme Court decision
during this period has been followed by elected officials decrying it,
nearly all have also had elected officials supporting it. In this way, the
absence of sustained unified government has given the Court the
independence to exercise its authority in many areas.

34. Examples include the Democrats during the periods of 1961-68, and 1977-80,
1993-94; and the Republicans from 1953 to 1954, and from 2001 to the present.

Our model also explains two major confrontations between the courts
and the elected branches-the first occurring in the late 1860s during
Reconstruction and the second occurring in the 1930s during the New
Deal. Although these time periods differ significantly, both featured
partisan and ideological changes that resulted in a confrontation between
a determined set of elected officials and a judiciary of a very, different
persuasion. In both cases, the Supreme Court suddenly faced a unified
government with very different preferences from its own. Without any
political officials to protect it, the Supreme Court capitulated.
Our model also yields a range of implications about the independent
authority of courts in other countries. In political environments where
the legislature is subordinate to the president, the latitude of courts is
small, so they cannot exert much political independence or authority. In
the strong presidential systems of LatinAmerica, for example Argentina
or Mexico, the courts typically exercise relatively little independent
authority. Yet, as Chavez shows,35 our perspective explains the vicissitudes
of judicial independence in Argentina since democratization. When
government is divided (at least one branch held by the opposition),
courts have more latitude. Thus, the courts were relatively independent
during the Alfonsin presidency in the 1980s, when the opposite party
held one chamber of the legislature. In contrast, the dramatic pliancy of
the courts through most of President Menem's term in the early 1990s
reflected his party's hold of unified government. The emergence of a
more independent judiciary at the end of Menem's term occurred
when he, too, faced divided government.
This perspective also explains aspects of judicial independence in
Chile.36 In the post-authoritarian era, Chile has been characterized by
both a strong presidency and divided government. As noted above, the
system is rigged so that the opposition holds a working majority in the
Senate through the institutional senators. As' our model predicts, Chile
also has an independent judiciary (also initially rigged to a degree to
favor Pinochet's interests).

35.
36.

See generally Chavez, supra note 14.
Id.; JOHN B. LONDREGAN, LEGISLATIVE

INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGY IN CHILE

(Randall Calvert & Thrainn Eggertsson eds., 2000); Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The
Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of
Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1994).
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Further, Barros 37 emphasizes that there was also a degree of judicial
independence during Chile's authoritarian period and that such
independence emerged as a result of conflict between two branches of
the armed services. Although the range of judicial independence was
relatively small in comparison to that in the democratic era, Barros
shows that it was non-negligible after 1980 and grew over time. Judicial
independence arose in part because the branches of the armed services
had no mechanism for coordinating their activities. This problem emerged
during the first days of the coup, when two different branches issued
conflicting curfew decrees. In the 1980s, the courts began to rule on
constitutional issues. Although the courts' latitude was relatively small,
the regime's preference for a referee allowed the courts to emerge as an
interpreter.

37. Robert Barros, Dictatorship and the Rule of Law: Rules and Military Power in
Pinochet's Chile, (paper prepared for the Conference on Democracy and the Rule of
Law, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March, Madrid,
Espafla (June 22-24, 2000) (on file with author)).
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